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This paper evaluates whether the proposed FTAAP is a desirable policy option for APEC 
member economies and the world economy. More specifically, this paper quantitatively 
investigates whether the FTAAP satisfies conditions for a trade bloc to generate positive and 
sufficient net trade creation effect. In addition, this paper estimates the likely impact of the 
FTAAP by using a CGE model analysis. Based on statistical data analysis, this paper strongly 
argues that the FTAAP can be a desirable regional trade bloc able to generate positive gains 
from freer trade. From the ex-ante scenario analysis using both static and capital 
accumulation CGE Models, this paper concludes that the FTAAP has great potential for 
improving welfare of participating APEC economies and will boost economic growth in the 
region. In particular, the FTAAP would be even better if it can be linked with liberalization of 
trade in services and enhanced trade facilitation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its inception in 1989, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has long 
strived to nurture the initially fledgling vision of building the Asia-Pacific economic 
community to maturity under the principle of ‘open regionalism.’ However, with its 20th 
anniversary, APEC appears to be adrift in the midst of formidable challenges that demand 
major changes and reforms. Among others, challenges posed by the organization’s unique 
characteristics, suffused with dynamism and diversity, is worth further examination. While 
the growing interdependence in the region as a result of economic dynamism heightened the 
need for the APEC to strengthen regional economic integration; the organization’s very 
diversity is, in effect, has led to a heterogeneity of economic interests and political stances 
that makes it very difficult to construct a proper architecture for the region as a whole.  
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) currently proliferating around the world, especially, 
in the East Asia region,
1 have made APEC consider the preferential liberalization approach a
an attractive policy alternative. More specifically, considering (i) the sluggish pace of 
negotiation for multilateral trade and investment liberalization under the WTO’s DDA (Doha 
Development Agenda) round, (ii) the failure of the APEC’s EVSL (Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization), (iii) the slow progress of the Bogor Goals, (iv) the loss of vitality of APEC 
economic activities after the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, (v) the spaghetti bowl 
phenomenon
2 expected from a complicated web of overlapping RTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
region, (vi) deepening interdependence among APEC member economies, and (vii) strong 
positive welfare effects expected from RTAs;
3 the revival and the promotion of the regional 
economic dynamism became top priority of APEC.   
Consequently, on the recognition of the potential negative impact caused by overlapping 
regional trade agreements, APEC has recently began searching for comprehensive and high-
 
1  For proliferating RTAs in East Asia, see JETRO (2003), Lu (2003), Kawai (2004), 
Feridhanusetyawan (2005), Lee and Park (2005), Park (2006), Kawai and Wignaraja (2008), 
and ADB (2008). 
2  See Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998) and Panagariya (1999) for the spaghetti 
bowl phenomenon caused by overlapping RTAs. 
3  See Scollay and Gilbert (2000), Scollay (2004, 2005, 2007), ABAC (2006), APEC (2007), 
Bergsten (2007), and Park (2008) for the economic effects of an RTA in APEC. 3 
 
level RTAs in order to supplement Bogor Goals through a harmonized integration of small-
scale regional free trade agreements in the region. For this purpose, the establishment of a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) is now being discussed with a long term 
perspective among APEC member economies as one of possible options to deepen regional 
economic integration. 
Under these circumstances, this paper attempts to provide an economic implication of an 
FTAAP as a catalyst to promote APEC’s vision of creating a single, unified economic 
community. In order to serve this purpose, we endeavor (i) to examine a more concrete 
rationale for APEC member economies discussing a possible FTAAP by assessing conditions 
for a desirable FTAAP and (ii) to analyze the economic impacts of an FTAAP. 
More specifically, we test whether the FTAAP satisfies necessary conditions for a trade 
bloc to generate positive and sufficient net trade creation effect by calculating trade-related 
indices representing market size, geographical proximity, tariff structure, trade volume, 
competitiveness, complementarity, and development level of member and nonmember 
economies. Moreover, to provide policy makers with a more realistic and practical forecast, 
the benefits linked to the core FTA chapters (liberalization for trade in goods) are analyzed in 
addition to the economic impact of trade facilitation and reduction of barriers in service trade 
by adopting both static and capital accumulation CGE models.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II characterizes briefly the existing RTAs in 
the APEC region, outlines conditions for a trade bloc to generate significant and sufficient net 
trade creation effects of RTAs, and evaluates whether the FTAAP satisfies these conditions. 
Section III proposes feasible policy options for member economies to consider as scenarios. 
Section IV describes data used and model specified, and summarizes simulation results 




II. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND FTAAP 
 
1. Regional Economic Integration in the APEC Region 
 
The APEC’s stance on multilateralism has been deeply influenced by the proliferating 4 
 
                                         
RTAs around the world, and especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Both intra- and inter-
regional trade agreements are proliferating in the Asia-Pacific region as shown in Table 1. As 
of May 2010, 40 RTAs have been implemented, 3 RTAs have been signed, and more than two 
dozen RTAs are being negotiated or considered by APEC member economies.   
There are some distinguishing characteristics that we may derive from RTAs between 
APEC member economies. First, the trend of regional economic cooperation between APEC 
members is a relatively new one. Most of the East Asian members of APEC, especially 
countries in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Korea, and Chinese Taipei), have been known to 
prefer nondiscriminatory multilateral liberalization efforts rather than a discriminatory 
regional liberalization policy. However, after realizing the importance of regional economic 
cooperation from the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Northeast Asian members have 
changed their policy stance from favoring a global approach to favoring a regional approach. 
As in Table 1, among the 43 RTAs implemented or signed, 38 RTAs have been implemented 
after the crisis. Second, most RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region have taken a form of bilateral 
negotiation similar to the world-wide trend of seeking a lower and easier negotiation cost 
even though the gains from resulting freer trade are limited. Third, there has been no 
distinction between intra- and inter-regional partnerships. Recent innovations in information 
and communication technology have significantly saved transaction costs and made 
geographical distance relatively less important. As Bergsten (2007) emphasizes, it can be a 
very important to avoid the risk of ‘drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific’. Fourth, 
considering the partnership issue of RTAs again, most sub-regional RTAs within APEC have 
created a complicated web of hub-and-spoke type of overlapping RTAs which may result in a 
spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In particular, ASEAN, Singapore, and Chile have been very 
aggressive in their pursuit to become a hub. Fifth, progress has been slow in taking an 
expansionary path of RTAs, which may trigger a domino effect of regionalism.
4 
As a response to the world-wide movement towards RTAs; and carefully considering the 
stalled multilateral DDA negotiations under the WTO, limitations of the unilateral approach 
under the Bogor Goals, and expected gains from the regional approach; APEC has decided to 
study the possibility of implementing the best RTAs since the leaders’ meeting in Santiago, 
 
4  See Baldwin (1993) for the domino effect of regionalism. 5 
 
                                         
Chile, in 2004. Since then, APEC has been examining the feasibility and desirability of an 
FTAAP as a long-term prospect for both APEC economies and the world economy. 
Acknowledging that the successful completion of WTO/DDA negotiations is the 
primary policy option to be pursued, Hatakeyama (2007), Stoler (2007), and Brilliant (2008) 
initiated by Bergsten (2007), argue that the FTAAP would be the best available insurance 
policy. In particular, Bergsten (2007) highlights that the FTAAP will (i) create positive and 
sufficient gains from free trade induced by the largest single trade bloc, (ii) become a 
stepping stone towards global free trade by inducing the WTO and excluded nonmembers 
like EU to resume the multilateral DDA negotiations, (iii) become the best available “Plan B” 
alternative to the DDA,
5 (iv) prevent competitive liberalizations in the Asia-Pacific region 
and mitigate the negative effects
6 of the proliferating hub-and-spoke type of overlapping 
RTAs by consolidating the sub-regional trade blocs into a large umbrella, (v) revitalize APEC, 
(vi) ameliorate the China-US economic conflict, caused mainly by trade imbalance between 
the two nations, and (vii) maintain US engagement in Asia. 
 
2. Conditions for a Desirable FTAAP 
 
Will the proposed FTAAP be a desirable RTA for APEC economies and the world 
economy as a whole? In order to be a ‘good’ RTA, the RTA should create a significant and 
sufficient positive welfare (trade creation) effect on all participating member countries and on 
the world as a whole, which will provide an incentive for RTAs to aim for a 
nondiscriminatory global free trade area. Otherwise, the RTA could easily stall and be 
ineffective as time passes. In addition to positive gains to members and the world economy, 
the negative welfare (trade diversion) effect on nonmembers should be minimized or avoided. 
That is, the RTA would be more desirable provided that the Pareto efficiency holds.
7 
 
5  The DDA negotiations in Geneva in July 2008 had been failed to agree on a package deal 
for multilateral liberalization under the WTO. 
6  See Kawai (2007) and Park (2006) for the problems caused by the overlapping RTAs.   
7 The Pareto efficiency is achieved when no further Pareto improvements is possible. The 
Pareto improvement refers to resource reallocation that can make someone better off 
without making someone else worse off. We may evaluate the Pareto improvement for 
member economies (economies participating in the FTAAP) and nonmember economies 6 
 
                                                                                                                                
How can we maximize the trade creation effect and minimize the trade diversion effect? 
In order to answer the question, we outline following conditions that need to be fulfilled.
8 
 
①  Market size of the union: larger the better 
②  Pre-union intra-regional tariff: higher the better 
③  Pre-union extra-regional tariff: lower the better 
④  Pre-union intra-regional trade volume: deeper the better 
⑤  Competitive pre-union industrial structure: tougher the better 
⑥  Complementary post-union industrial structure: stronger the better 
⑦  Pre-union level of economic development gap: narrower the better 
⑧  Geographical proximity: closer the better 
 
Overall, APEC economies satisfy most of the conditions for the positive welfare effects 
expected. Table 2 figures key economic indicators of APEC economies to be used for 
evaluating the above-mentioned conditions required for measuring the welfare effect of an 
RTA. The consolidated market size (40% of the world population and 53% of the world 
GDP) is large enough to create a positive trade creation effect. The pre-union tariff structure 
is a controversial factor but a relatively higher deviation of tariffs among APEC member 
economies and lower tariff rates of the APEC economies (5.0% and 6.4%) than that of the 
world as a whole (7.1% and 9.8%) may guarantee significant net trade creation effect as 
APEC successfully launches its regional trade bloc. As shown in Table 3, the strong 
interdependence among APEC member economies in terms of intra-regional trade share of 
 
(economies excluded from the FTAAP). The APEC’s basic principle of the open 
regionalism has been designed to achieve the Pareto efficiency by avoiding the harmful 
effect of the discriminatory regional trade liberalization on nonmember economies. 
8  Salvatore (2007) lists some critical factors that maximize the trade creation effect and 
minimize the trade diversion effect of customs unions. Larger union size, higher pre-union 
tariff structure between members, lower pre-union tariff structure between members and 
nonmembers, higher pre-union intra-regional trade, greater substitutability of production 
structures between members and nonmembers, and geographical proximity will all create 
larger trade gains. See Lee and Park (2005) and Park, Park, and Estrada (2008) for more 
detailed information about the conditions. 7 
 
over 65% is the most promising factor in expecting a large trade creation effect.   
Considering the large number of membership (21 nations) in FTAAP, we know that the 
pre-union industrial structure of the potential members is competitive and may expect 
significant efficiency gains from the regional free trade. In addition, Table 4 estimates the 
complementarity index of 14 APEC economies. It takes a value between 0 and 100, with 0 
indicating no overlap and 100 indicating perfect overlap. The simple averaged 
complementarity index of APEC is 53.7, a figure not excessively high or low. We may also 
expect a significant net trade creation effect from economies of scale after the establishment 
of a single market in the APEC region. 
By contrast, the expected welfare effect of the last two conditions will not be positive 
due to the diversity in the level of economic development among the 21 APEC member 
economies. Relatively larger number of membership covering wider areas in APEC may lead 
to higher cost of transaction. The welfare effect of the FTAAP on individual member 
economy will depend on the membership combination, and the overall effect on APEC as a 
whole will be heavily affected by the bilateral combination of membership. Thus it may not 
be possible to evaluate the welfare effect without a rigorous method of quantifying the likely 
effect of an RTA in APEC. We need to adopt economic modeling methodologies such as an 
ex-ante computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation analysis. 
 
 
III. FEASIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE BEST PRACTICED FTAAP 
 
The welfare effect of the FTAAP on an individual member economy and APEC as a 
whole will depend on not only the economic linkages of the members analyzed in Section II 
but also the scope of the agreement. Following scopes are necessary conditions for the 
FTAAP to be a comprehensive and high-quality RTA. The selected conditions as scenarios 
will be quantitatively investigated in the following chapter with static and capital 
accumulation CGE models.   
First, a desirable RTA should include some essential elements for deeper integration. As 
summarized in Elek (2005, p. 99), desirable RTAs in APEC should satisfy the following 
contents: WTO-plus approach, comprehensive in scope by liberalization of all sectors and 
minimization of any phase-out periods for sensitive products, compatible with multilateral 8 
 
liberalization, simple rules of origin (RoO), transparency, and openness. Soesastro (2003) 
also emphasizes open accession; MFN based multilateral liberalization approach, and 
harmonization of RoO. In particular, Plummer (2007) proposes the 'Ten Commandments' of 
the best practice FTAs; such as comprehensive coverage within a reasonable period of time, 
low and symmetrical RoO, progress in trade facilitation such as customs procedures, 
intellectual property protection, nondiscriminatory foreign direct investment-related 
provisions, transparent anti-dumping procedures and dispute resolution, open and 
nondiscriminatory government procurement, competition policy, and low and standardized 
technical barriers to trade.   
Second, because this research is an empirical investigation of the likely impact of the 
FTAAP, the selected conditions for the deeper integration of desirable RTAs should be 
quantitatively evaluated. Thus, some of the above-mentioned conditions will be excluded 
because they are not suitable for specification into a CGE model for quantitative analysis.   
Third, fully feasible scenarios should be envisioned. As mentioned earlier, better ways 
for promoting the FTAAP can be addressed, including support for small-scale regional free 
trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region compatible with WTO’s multilateralism and 
accommodating APEC’s fundamental principles such as open regionalism and non-binding 
voluntarism. 
In this light, trade liberalization through tariff reduction or elimination in trade of goods 
needs to be prioritized for implementation of comprehensive and specific measures. The 
quantitative analysis on the liberalization of trade in services is another aspect of interest in 
addressing the increasing importance of the industry. Considering APEC’s ongoing efforts to 
reduce trade cost, combined effect of trade liberalization through traditional tariff reduction 
and trade facilitation is strongly suggested as a test scenario. In sum, the following three 
elements of a desirable and feasible RTA are introduced for deeper integration in APEC. 
 
1. Comprehensive Application of Tariff Elimination in Goods Trade 
 9 
 
                                         
According to the Gravity model estimation with fixed effects by Park and Park (2009a), 
positive trade-enhancing effect is expected when GATT Article XXIV
9 is strictly applied, 
which can be observed. It was found that RTAs under GATT Article XXIV create more intra-
bloc trade (8.2%) and divert less extra-bloc trade (-8.1%) than RTAs in general (3.5% and -
11.6%, respectively). The trade creation effect under the Enabling Clause is negative (-7.1%), 
and trade diversion effect is somewhat stronger (-8.6%) than that under GATT Article 
XXIV.
10 In accordance with the outcomes, it is strongly suggested that FTAAP should be 
promoted across the all tradable sectors. 
 
2. Liberalization of Trade in Services 
 
With innovations in telecommunication and information technology, deregulations in 
public sectors, liberalization of capital flows, and facilitation of services trade through 
proliferating FTAs; more non-tradable services have become tradable. The world's total 
amount of trade in services increased 10 times from 387 billion US$ in 1980 to 3,730 billion 
US$ in 2008. In addition, the proportion of services trade shows sluggish increase from 
16.0% in 1980 to 18.8% in 2008. The proportion of service industry in total GDP of some of 
the developed economies has increased as well. In particular, in recognition of the fact that 
the service industry is believed to play a key role in producing final consumption goods and 
in enhancing productivity in manufacturing industry for intermediate goods, the liberalization 
of services trade is expected to create enormous economic welfare effect through the overall 
enhancement of productivity.   
Brown, et al (1996) estimates the effects of services trade liberalization in Uruguay 
Round by using the multi-economy Michigan CGE model. Dee and Hanslow (2001) quantify 
the effects of eliminating all post-Uruguay trade barriers and find that there are still 
considerable gains from trade liberalization in agriculture and manufacturing, but larger gains 
would come from trade liberalization in services. In particular, Konan and Maskus (2006) 
 
9 The most important requirements stipulated in GATT Article XXIV are that members (i) do 
not raise external trade barriers against nonmembers and (ii) eliminate duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to ‘substantially all trade’ within a 
reasonable length of time. 
10  Park and Park (2009a). 10 
 
compare the impacts of goods versus services liberalization in a developing economy. 
Employing a CGE model, they show that trade liberalization in goods yields a modest gain in 
aggregate welfare, while reducing service barriers generate relatively large welfare gains. 
These results imply the potential importance of services liberalization for economic 
development. Park and Park (2009b) also estimate the impact of RTAs under General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V on intra- and extra-bloc membership by 
using a gravity regression analysis. They find that the intra-bloc membership experiences a 
20.8 percent increase in imported services and induces significant cumulative effects on trade 
in service. 
 
3. Enhancing Trade Facilitation 
 
Trade facilitation improves the welfare of importing economies by narrowing the gap 
between the world market price and domestic price of imported goods, leading to an increase 
in the volume of world trade. As Kim et al. (2006) mentioned, APEC has chosen TILF (Trade 
and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation) and ECOTEC (Economic and Technical 
Cooperation) as core cooperation measures, and improved the environment for trade 
facilitation to achieve sustainable expansion of market in the Asia-Pacific region, 
contributing to the establishment of the infrastructure for its sustainable development and 
increasing economic welfare in the region. Analysis on economic effects from the trade-
facilitating efforts as a supplementary measure for trade liberalization and from 
improvements in the trade facilitation in conformity with the APEC’s open regionalism, are 
required. The welfare effects of enhanced trade facilitation on APEC member economies by 
Kim et al. (2006) are estimated as significantly positive, which is comparable to that of the 
tariff-reducing trade liberalization. 
 
4. Feasible Scenarios for the FTAAP 
 
Considering the above-mentioned necessary scopes to be tested for a desirable FTAAP 




                                         
A. Scenario I: Basic Scenario for Trade Liberalization through Tariff Elimination 
B. Scenario II: (I) + Liberalization of Trade in Services   
C. Scenario III: (II) + Trade Facilitation 
 
A. Scenario I: Basic Scenario for Trade Liberalization through Tariff Elimination 
 
APEC (2005) assessed that average applied tariffs of APEC economies have been 
reduced significantly since APEC’s inception, from 16.9 percent in 1989 to 5.5 per cent in 
2004. It also reports that almost half of all APEC economies’ tariff lines are at less than 5 
percent, and tariffs on many goods are now set at zero or negligible levels. As tariffs 
decreased, the focus of free trade agreements diversified. If an FTAAP is defined as a 
comprehensive and high-quality, large scale FTA in this analytical exercise, it is reasonable to 
assume a full elimination of tariffs in trading goods. That is, in order to analyze the effects of 
FTAAP on the economies of members and nonmembers in general as a reference value, it is 
assumed that the FTAAP member economies in the Asia-Pacific region join the free trade 
area and completely eliminate tariffs in agricultural and manufacturing sectors with no 
excluded sectors. 
 
B. Scenario II: (I) + Liberalization of Trade in Services 
 
Recent FTAs adopt comprehensive clauses including investment, service, intellectual 
property, competition, government procurement, and E-commerce that go beyond the scope 
of traditional FTAs. Accordingly, in addition to Scenario I, we assume that the FTAAP 
member economies liberalize trade in services by reducing the tariff-equivalent barrier (see 
Table 5) by 10 percent in construction, distribution, transportation and telecommunication, 
and business and financial service.
11 The tariff-equivalent barrier in the service sectors of this 
 
11  Trade liberalization in services can be applied in principle to all services sectors. However, 
in reality, there are some services that are provided at non-market conditions. Article I (3) of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) excludes “services supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority”. Thus, the public service sector has been excluded. 12 
 
                                         
research are adopted from Hoekman (1995).
12  
 
C. Scenario III: (II) + Trade Facilitation 
 
In addition to Scenario II, enhanced trade facilitation is addressed by saving five percent 
of trade costs, for example, in four areas of trade facilitation




IV. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF FTAAP 
 
1. CGE Model 
 
A. Static and Capital Accumulation CGE Models 
 
In order to provide a quantitative assessment on the effects of an FTAAP on both 
member and nonmember economies, the following two CGE models have been adopted. The 
first is the standard CGE model, in which the gains from trade liberalization stem mainly 
from the increased efficiency of resource allocation. It refers to the static CGE model. In 
particular, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, which has been extensively used 
in existing literature to examine a wide variety of trade policy issues, has been employed. The 
GTAP model is based on assumptions such as constant returns to scale, perfect competition 
and a global bank designed to mediate between world savings and investment. The Constant 
Difference of Elasticities (CDE) consumer demand system is designed to identify the 
differential prices and income responsiveness across economies.
14  
The second model is designed to capture not only the static effects, but also the capital 
accumulation effects. It refers to the capital accumulation CGE model. This model takes into 
 
12 As Hoekman (1995) does not supply information on trade barriers of Vietnam, this 
research replaces the trade barriers of Vietnam with the trade barriers of Indonesia. 
13  Based on the APEC’s Shanghai Accord in 2001, the four areas of trade facilitation are 
customs procedures, standard and conformity, business mobility, and electronic commerce. 
14 See Hertel (1997) about the structure of the GTAP model. account for the positive relationship between trade, investment and growth (so called trade-
induced investment-led growth) that is fairly well-established in a number of empirical 
studies. The standard GTAP model has been modified in order to identify medium-run growth 
effects of trade liberalization. Baldwin (1989, 1992) suggests that the static efficiency gains 
induce higher savings and investment, which in turn yield more output. Francois et al. (1999) 
present a useful approach capturing the capital accumulation effects of trade liberalization in 
the context of the neoclassical growth model. Following Francois et al. (1999) it is assumed 
that economies are initially in a steady state even though it is not realistic. Under this 
assumption, the magnitudes of changes in the capital stock and output can be obtained by 
comparing them in two steady states. The relationship between capital stock (K) and 




K =                          ( 1 )  
 
where  δ   is the depreciation rate.   
 
Incorporating the equation (1) into the CGE model gives a description of the 
relationship between capital stock and investment, and controls the closure according to the 
equation (1) so that the change in capital stock and investment converge. That is, this second 
CGE model is constructed to take into account possible changes in capital formation that may 
be generated by an FTAAP. 
 
B. Specification for Trade in Services 
 
An FTAAP is expected to be the comprehensive agreement, which involves not only 
bilateral liberalization and facilitation of trade in agricultural and manufactured goods 
through reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also liberalization of trade in services, 
establishment of an investment agreement, increased collaboration on intellectual property 
and so on. In particular, there is now greater recognition of the fact that liberalization of trade 
in services will be beneficial, as we have mentioned earlier. 
In order to capture the effects of trade liberalization in services, the methods of Hertel et 
13 
 al. (2000) and Anderson et al. (2000) have been used. Brown et al. (1996) suggested a 
modeling method that constructs the base data to include the tariff equivalents. In this model, 
trade liberalization in services generates tariff revenue; although, in reality, there are no tariffs. 
Hertel et al. (2000) and Anderson et al. (2000) assume instead that barriers to trade in services 
reduce the actual volume of service trade that can be delivered at a given cost. In contrast, 
trade liberalization in services leads to the increase of the amount of services and reduction of 
price of imported services in the domestic market. These effects can be captured by 
introducing a services import-augmenting component into the CGE model.   
 
C. Specification for Trade Facilitation 
 
To estimate the effects of trade facilitation, the standard CGE model has been modified 
to adopt the simple “iceberg” model of trading costs, introduced by Samuelson (1954). Some 
units of the good “melt” in transit, which can be thought of as a cost of trading that good. 
Then, an effective price of the good    imported from economy  i r  at domestic prices is 
introduced in destination economy  :  . This is associated with the observed price,  , 
as following:   
s
*







*          ( 2 )  
where    reflects the trade facilitation costs for the good  . An increase in   by 
enhanced trade facilitation means a fall in the effective price of the good   imported  from 
irs A i irs A
i r 
to  , thus encouraging an expansion of imports. To ensure a balanced data set, a quantity 
adjustment equation is required. Similar to the definition of the effective price, the adjusted 
effective quantity is as follows. 
s
 
irs irs irs A Q Q ⋅ =
*          ( 3 )  
 
Incorporating equations (2) and (3) into the standard CGE model, the effects of trade 







The world economy is organized into 15 sectors, 19 APEC economies and 2 regions 
(EU, ROW) hereafter for the CGE model analysis (All of the above are listed in Table 6). 
Social accounting data are based on the GTAP version 7 database. Initial protection data are 
representative of the world as of 2004. Among APEC member economies, relevant data set 
for Brunei Darussalam and Papua New Guinea are missing. Thus, the two member 
economies are excluded from this study. 
As the importance of services in global trade increases, economists have recently begun 
to pay more attention to this issue. However, it is not easy to analyze the effects of 
liberalization of the services industry because of the relative lack of information and the lack 
of availability of cross-economy data on trade barriers. Impediments to trade in services do 
not take the form of import tariffs, but rather of a complex variety of quantitative restrictions, 
prohibitions and regulations. Quantitative restrictions may control the number of foreign 
providers or limit their market share. For this reason, it is very difficult to obtain systematic 
information on trade barriers in the service industry. Given the absence of detailed data on 
trade barriers, a CGE approach is not applicable to assess the impact of services trade. 
In such circumstances, economists rely on indirect methods. There have been several 
attempts to measure trade barriers in services. Deardorff and Stern (2001) classify the 
methodologies for measuring three types of barriers: frequency measures, quantity-based 
measures and price-based measures. The first approach, followed by Hoekman (1995), is to 
construct ‘guesstimates’ of relative restrictiveness across economies based on the assumption 
that each economy has revealed its policy stance in the commitments made in GATS. To 
quantify trade barriers in services across economies and industry levels, frequency ratios are 
constructed based on the number of commitments scheduled in GATS in each economy. After 
that, tariff equivalent benchmarks are assigned to each sector to reflect the degree of 
restriction with respect to market access. A benchmark tariff equivalent of 200 percent is 
assigned to sectors in which market access is most restricted (that is, maritime, air transport, 
portal services and etc.). Benchmark tariff equivalents between 20 percent and 50 percent are 
designated for the remaining sectors. Hoekman (1995) then multiplies each coverage index 
by the tariff equivalent benchmark guesstimates to obtain a sector-specific tariff equivalent.   
The guesstimates have some limitations. Hardin and Holmes (1997) indicate that 16 
 
Hoekman’s estimates may not reflect the actual impediments because these measures are 
based on information contained in each economy’s schedule of GATS commitments. 
However, a lack of commitment to a GATS schedule does not necessarily mean that an 
economy imposes heavy restrictions. Many developing economies simply do not have 
available details that are required to meet the complexities of the GATS scheduling process 
and so leaves many industries unbounded, some of which may be quite open. Furthermore, 
Hoekman (1995) treats all commitments with equal weights and does not distinguish between 
barriers according to their economic impact, with minor impediments receiving the same 
weighting as an almost complete refusal of access. In summary, the guesstimates are very 
crude and rely on assumptions about the level of prohibitive benchmark tariff equivalents, 
which are arbitrarily determined by the researcher. In spite of these limitations of Hoekman’s 
approach, this paper uses the modified Hoekman’s guesstimates for the analysis on the 
economic effects of an FTAAP, since they provide worldwide trade barriers in services. In 
fact, Hoekman’s guestimates cover 15 of APEC’s member economies. 
 
3. Simulation Results 
 
It should be noted that the estimated results of CGE simulations are sensitive to the 
assumptions made in the modeling. One should be cautious in the interpretation of the results 
of CGE simulations. The relative effects of different agreements or different policy 
experiments are more important than the absolute size of estimated effects. Thus this paper 
focuses on the relative effects gained by estimating three different scenarios under the same 
CGE model (see Table 10).   
First one is the results of Scenario I in which tariffs between FTAAP members are 
removed. Table 7 presents the economy-wide effects of the FTAAP under the assumption of a 
fixed capital stock. These involve changes in real GDP, welfare, exports, and imports. It is 
expected that real GDP increases in developed economies such as the United States, Japan, 
Canada, Australia and Singapore are relatively smaller than in developing economies, yet an 
FTAAP will be beneficial to all economies. However, the welfare of Canada, Chile, Indonesia, 
Russia and Peru, though small, would decrease. We also find that the tariff eliminating 
regional FTA expands intra-regional trade and contracts extra-regional trade. 
The results of the policy experiment Scenario II are reported in Table 8, which presents 17 
 
the economic effects of tariff elimination and reduction in tariff equivalents of services by 10 
percent. These effects are estimated also by using a static CGE model. Compared to Scenario 
I, the FTAAP according to Scenario II yields higher economic gains for APEC individual 
member as well as economies as a whole in terms of real GDP and welfare. All member 
economies of an FTAAP would experience positive growth in real GDP and welfare. 
Moreover, the magnitude of these positive effects is larger than those of Scenario I as 
compared in Table 10. These results imply that service liberalization has significant impacts 
on GDP as well as the welfare of each member economy. In this respect, we also may argue 
that liberalization in services leads to increased efficiency in service sectors. Since services 
are basic inputs or intermediates for industrial production, the competitiveness of 
manufacturing sectors would also be improved.   
This study also discusses the results of the policy experiment Scenario III that includes 
Scenario II and 5% reduction in trade cost by trade facilitation. The economic effects of an 
FTAAP according to Scenario III are reported in Table 9. Comparing these results with those 
of Scenario I and II, the magnitude of increases in real GDP and welfare of all member 
economies has been found to expand. The relative additional gains to APEC economy as a 
whole are shown in Table 10. This implies that trade facilitation is one of the most important 
catalysts of economic growth and its impacts on GDP and welfare are significant.   
The capital accumulation effects of an FTAAP, which captures not only static gains but 
also mid to medium-run growth bonus suggested by Baldwin (1989, 1992), has also been 
analyzed. The effects on the economic welfare and GDP of economies stem from the 
traditional efficiency gains from resource allocation and additional gains from capital 
accumulation. Table 9 also shows that medium-run effects of the FTAAP according to 
Scenario III for the member economies, estimated with the capital accumulation CGE model, 
would be larger compared to the effects on GDP and welfare estimated with the static CGE 
model as compared in Table 10 for APEC as a whole. Moreover, the results indicate that the 
overall economic outcome is more favorable than any of the other Scenarios. More 
specifically, the outcome reports the highest welfare gains among other scenarios as it 
estimates welfare gain by 3.08 percentages for all APEC member economies. In addition, the 
outcome also yields relatively higher growth gains for some developing economies including 
Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia. We have interpreted this outcome as follows: 1) as GTAP 
data base initially reports relatively high tariff rates for these economies, the size of the 18 
 
impact will be greater and 2) the unique methodology for estimating capital accumulation 
CGE model and assumptions used in this scenario may result in favorable outcome for those 
economies having a large demand for capital.   
In fact, evidence of high quality and medium-run growth bonus of trade liberalization is 
found if the results estimated by the static model were compared with those estimated by the 
capital accumulation model. It is expected that real GDP for APEC members as a whole 
would increase by 3.31 percentage (Capital Accumulation under Scenario III), whereas only 
0.13 percentage (Static under Scenario I) increase in real GDP for APEC economies would 
result from the static CGE model. Furthermore, the gains for Thailand and Vietnam in terms 
of real GDP are higher than other member countries. This implies that traditional trade 
liberalization in market access still has important and significant impacts on real GDP and 
welfare in those countries. 
Economic Effects of three sub-regional RTAs are also estimated and shown in Tables 11, 
12, and 13. Table 11 suggests that formation of a TPP does not produce significant trade 
diversion effect for non-participating members. We also may argue that non-participating 
members, except Russia, will also enjoy the benefit of free trade if the medium-run growth 
bonus effect is taken into account. However, with some minor exceptions, formation of East 
Asian sub-regional RTAs, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, will produce negative effects on the 
GDP and welfare of non-participating members, while positive economic effects on GDP and 
welfare are shown for participating member economies.   
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The formation of an FTAAP is a challenge to and an opportunity for the reformation of 
APEC. The positive gains from a larger free trade bloc are expected to be significant enough 
to invite all APEC members to join. At the same time, however, the trade and investment 
liberalization of APEC through the second-best policy may encounter strong obstacles 
incurred by diversified interests of member economies as a group or as an individual 
economy, lack of political will, and problems of compatibility with multilateralism and basic 
principles of APEC. 19 
 
Acknowledging these difficulties involved in the formation of the FTAAP, this study 
tested whether the proposed FTAAP may satisfy necessary conditions for positive net trade 
creation effects of an RTA and found that the FTAAP can be a desirable RTA for members. 
In addition, we designed a desirable FTAAP with following three policy options: 1) 
comprehensive application of tariff elimination in goods trade under the legal provision of 
GATT Article XXIX without any excluded sectors, 2) liberalization of trade in services, 3) 
enhancing trade facilitation. If we summarize the expected gains from each scenario, the 
overall welfare gain for all subject economies range from US$55 billion to US$ 284 billion 
and US$ 149 billion to US$ 636 billion under static and capital accumulation models, 
respectively.  
Although it is too early to outline an FTAAP as the research is still at an early stage, the 
results so far indicate that APEC should pursue a high-quality and comprehensive agreement 
for maximum economic output. Particularly in this paper, trade facilitation and liberalization 
of service trade have been found to contribute significantly towards increases in real GDP 
and trade volume. This fact, aligned with the mandates from Leaders and Ministers as 
reflected in various declaration of past years including those from the 2005 Busan Roadmap 
and 2007 Report on Strengthening Regional Economic Integration, implies that FTAAP 
should be a high-quality and comprehensive agreement. 
In terms of regional institutional architecture, the break-up of the APEC into East Asian 
region and Pacific region may be realized with insufficient trans-regional cooperation. So as 
to avoid easily foreseeable and enormous negative effects, an FTAAP to integrate the Asia-
Pacific region becomes critical. In this light, a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) 
including P4 and P8 is also believed to have potential to become a stepping-stone to promote 
high-quality, comprehensive RTAs on a global scale. Moreover, in recognition of outcomes 
from the successful Uruguay Round and AFTA, the establishment of the FTAAP is expected 
to trigger a China-Japan-Korea FTA, an ASEAN+3 FTA, an ASEAN+6 FTA, and a TPP, 
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Table 1. Major RTAs between APEC Member Economies as of May 2010 
 
Implemented  
(year into force) 
Signed  
(year of signing)  Under Negotiation  Under 
Consideration 

























































































Source: Compiled based mainly on data from the WTO Website and http://www.bilaterals.org. 25 
 
























Australia 21.4  1,015.2  47,370  3.9    3.4 
Brunei  Darussalam  0.4  14.6*   37,053*  3.1**   3.7** 
Canada 33.3  1,501.3  45,070  3.6    3.6 
Chile  16.8  169.5   10,084  1.4   6.0 
China 1,324.7  4,327.0  3,267  8.6    9.6 
Hong Kong, China  7.0  215.4    30,863  0.0    0.0 
Indonesia  227.3  510.7   2,247  5.8**   6.9** 
Japan 127.7  4,910.8  38,455  2.6    3.1 
Korea  48.6  929.1   19,115  8.3**   12.1** 
Malaysia  27.0  221.8   8,209  5.9**   7.2** 
Mexico 106.4  1,088.1  10,232  6.4    12.5 
New  Zealand  4.3  129.9   30,439  2.8   2.2 
Papua New Guinea  6.6  8.2    1,253  4.5    4.8 
Peru  28.8  129.1   4,477  3.8   6.1 
Philippines  90.3  166.9   1,847  5.0**   6.3** 
Russian Federation  142.0  1,679.5  11,832  8.2    8.8 
Singapore  4.8  181.9   37,597  0.0   0.0 
Chinese Taipei  23.0  391.4*  16,988*  6.5    6.1 
Thailand  67.4  272.4   4,043  10.8***   11.9*** 
United States  304.1  14,093.3  46,350  3.0    3.7 
Vietnam  86.2  90.6   1,051  11.7**   16.8** 
APEC  (A)  2,698.1  32,047.0  11,878  5.0   6.4  
World  (B)  6,697.3  60,557.0  9,042  7.1   9.8  
A/B  (%)  40.3  52.9   131.0   71.2   65.4  
Notes: * - data from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/index.html 
**- year 2007 
***-year 2006 




Table 3. Intraregional Trade Share: 2000-2008 (%) 
 
Region  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ASEAN  23.0 22.3 22.7 24.7 24.9 25.3 24.9 25.2 25.4 
NAFTA  55.7 55.5 56.6 56.1 55.9 55.7 53.9 51.3 49.5 
MERCOSUR  20.0 17.1 11.5 11.9 12.7 12.9 13.5 15.0 15.4 
EU  67.7 67.3 67.4 68.3 68.1 67.4 67.7 67.9 67.2 
APEC  73.1 72.6 73.3 72.7 72.1 70.8 69.4 67.4 65.7 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2009.Table 4. Complementarity of APEC Economies in 2007 
Source




Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia New 
Zealand  Philippines Russia Singapore Thailand US Vietnam 
Australia      61.91 33.37  49.36 67.91 65.54  64.04 32.22  57.62  29.15  62.03 70.55  76.35 42.65 
China 38.20      36.77  47.05  67.84  74.59  66.55 29.74  61.58  27.91  66.21 67.15  71.42 33.40 
Hong Kong China 29.31  67.78      34.06  58.31  65.31  67.89 26.30  72.96  16.64  75.85 62.21  58.32 30.73 
Indonesia  43.47 63.94 36.76      63.79 67.79  68.40 31.22  56.70  37.17  69.33 70.15  70.56 44.14 
Japan 61.20  55.12  34.67  69.96      51.27  60.07 34.74  55.38  47.08  58.51 59.29  62.17 54.07 
Korea 46.33  64.36  35.46  53.18  63.78      69.02 31.55  59.19  38.61  69.51 65.63  68.15 43.79 
Malaysia 34.93  71.19  35.85  44.02 66.31 73.02      30.95  75.56  28.44 81.03  68.30  64.79  36.36 
New Zealand  41.07  57.22  31.46  50.87 60.91 63.61  60.34      53.80  30.48 58.41  66.59  74.45  43.99 
Philippines 38.45  64.66  36.68  43.67 59.38 69.89  70.55  31.40      28.47 74.89  64.60  62.54  37.23 
Russia 32.65  66.93  36.91  41.84  66.61 59.58  51.75  33.69  59.30     49.83  67.60  71.66  39.56 
Singapore 41.00  68.53  34.54  49.89 63.73 70.83  81.36  27.87  66.99 34.50      64.46  61.45  43.06 
Thailand 39.66  69.36  37.86  43.83 71.90 72.20  72.08  30.80  64.80 33.99  72.77      73.06  35.95 
US  44.67 64.03 36.81  54.09 64.47 67.71  66.44 30.98  59.72  32.86  65.64 70.11      48.33 
Vietnam 43.99  54.29  35.30  52.98 53.46 60.89  61.09  33.45  49.40 39.50  58.67  61.52  65.18     
Notes: 1) 
 
where d is the importing country of interest, s is the exporting country of interest, w is the set of all countries in the world, i is the set of industries, x is the commodity export 
flow, X is the total export flow, m the commodity import flow, and M the total import flow. In words, we take the sum of the absolute value of the difference between the 
sectoral import shares of one country and the sectoral export shares of the other. Dividing by 2 coverts this to a number between 0 and 1, with zero indicating all shares 
matched and 1 indicating none did. Subtracting from one reverses the sign, and multiplying by 100 puts the measure in percentage terms. It takes a value between 0 and 100, 
with zero indicating no overlap and 100 indicating a perfect match in the import/export pattern (UNESCAP, Trade Statistics in Policymaking: A Handbook of Commonly 
Used Trade Indices and Indicators). 
2) * indicates a simple average of all the complementarity indices in the table.   
3) Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Peru, and Chinese Taipei are excluded because the data source does not report the index of these countries. 




Table 5. Tariff-equivalent Barrier in Service Sectors in APEC 
 




Australia 12.0  7.4  183.4  24.8 
Canada 6.0  9.0  117.7  25.9 
Chile 40.0  34.4  82.2  45.2 
China 25.0  35.5  191.1  39.8 
Hong Kong, China  32.0  31.5  149.8  39.0 
Indonesia 16.0  34.8  190.4  43.1 
Japan 5.0  4.6  142.0  28.9 
Korea 16.0  21.4  184.9  36.3 
Malaysia 10.0  34.8  175.8  36.1 
Mexico 24.0  21.3  152.3  40.9 
New Zealand  5.0  13.4  181.5  30.5 
Peru 40.0  30.3  190.9  48.7 
Philippines 40.0  32.8  110.2  41.7 
Singapore 12.0  34.4  138.8  35.9 
Thailand 28.0  32.5  189.6  42.2 
USA 5.0  4.6  111.4  21.7 
Vietnam 16.0  34.8  190.4  43.1 
Note: As Hoekman does not provide tariff equivalents for Vietnam, tariff equivalents of 
Indonesia have been used for Vietnam as proxy. 
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Table 7. Effects of an FTAAP: Scenario I (% deviations from the Base) 
Tariff Elimination with Static Model   
 
  Real GDP  Welfare  Welfare 
(mil. US$) Export Import 
19  APEC  Economies  0.13  0.25 55,424 4.88  6.56 
Australia  0.09  0.25 1,401 4.54 4.88 
Canada  0.04 -0.07  -627 1.07  0.93 
Chile  0.07 0.00 -2 -0.20  0.09 
China  0.27   0.38   5,733   10.11   13.05  
Hong  Kong  0.00   1.67   2,419   4.03   4.15  
Indonesia  0.17   -0.16   -378   5.08   6.79  
Japan  0.14   0.37   14,887   6.41   8.39  
Korea  0.86   1.36   8,109   6.79   9.97  
Malaysia  2.45   2.69   3,029   3.73   7.22  
Mexico  0.25   0.07   402   0.86   2.17  
New  Zealand  0.16   1.45   1,252   6.19   7.91  
Peru  0.01   -0.25   -151   3.75   5.40  
Philippines  0.26   0.69   519   3.69   4.86  
Russia  -0.08   -0.09   -489   1.23   3.05  
Singapore  0.03   1.16   1,098   0.05   0.01  
Thailand  1.23   6.18   7,414   -0.03   23.09  
Chinese  Taipei  0.54   1.52   4,301   5.56   7.08  
USA  0.01   0.03   3,520   3.63   1.91  
Viet  Nam  5.05   8.02   2,987   25.71   39.25  
EU25  -0.04   -0.13   -14,346  -0.74   -1.48  
ROW  -0.05   -0.48   -18,619  -1.72   -2.71  
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Table 8. Effects of an FTAAP: Scenario II (% deviations from the Base) 
Tariff Elimination + Reduction in Tariff Equivalents of Services by 10% 
with Static Model   
 
  Real GDP  Welfare  Welfare 
(mil. US$) Export Import 
19 APEC Economies  0.20 0.36  75,621  5.12  6.88 
Australia 0.23  0.44  2,501  5.26  5.69 
Canada  0.17   0.09   769   1.31   1.27  
Chile  0.19   0.14   117   -0.02   0.29  
China  0.34   0.45   6,793  10.23   13.18  
Hong  Kong  0.60   2.65   3,848  5.07   5.54  
Indonesia  0.47   1.84   1,590  6.98   9.01  
Japan  0.21   0.45   18,097  6.71   8.89  
Korea  1.17   1.68   10,023  6.93   10.18  
Malaysia  2.70   3.00   3,373  3.84   7.39  
Mexico  0.34   0.17   1,051  1.06   2.37  
New  Zealand  0.47   1.84   1,590  6.98   9.01  
Peru  0.10   -0.14   -83   4.18   5.94  
Philippines  0.35   0.82   615   3.78   4.99  
Russia  0.03   0.03   147   1.42   3.36  
Singapore  0.79   2.17   2,051  -0.07   -0.05  
Thailand  1.45   6.63   7,948  -0.12   23.65  
Chinese  Taipei  0.73   1.75   4,950  5.71   7.25  
USA  0.04   0.08   8,816  3.99   2.21  
Viet  Nam  5.29   8.30   3,093  25.74   39.37  
EU25  -0.04   -0.14   -16,254  -0.82   -1.62  




Table 9. Effects of an FTAAP: Scenario III (% deviations from the Base) 
Tariff Elimination + Reduction in Tariff Equivalents of Services by 10% 
+ 5% Reduction in Trade Cost by Trade Facilitation 
 













19 APEC Economies  1.13 1.38  284,844 8.53 10.91 3.31 3.08 636,009  14.73  15.89
Australia 1.18  1.55  8,829 7.09 8.41 3 3. .2 20 0 3 3. .2 29 9 1 18 8, ,7 77 78 8  1 10 0. .7 79 9  1 10 0. .5 57 7
Canada 1.73  2.10  18,481 3.62 5.33 3 3. .7 70 0 3 3. .5 55 5 3 31 1, ,2 28 82 2  6 6. .1 12 2  6 6. .5 59 9
Chile 1.61  1.95  1,611 0.75 0.95 4 4. .9 90 0 4 4. .8 89 9 4 4, ,0 05 55 5  3 3. .8 88 8  4 4. .1 17 7
China 2.24  2.41  36,529 16.20 19.76 7 7. .6 68 8 6 6. .9 96 6 1 10 05 5, ,5 50 09 9  2 21 1. .1 11 1  2 26 6. .5 59 9
Hong Kong  3.09  6.68  9,696 6.30 7.52 1 11 1. .3 39 9 1 13 3. .2 28 8 1 19 9, ,2 26 63 3  1 13 3. .0 07 7  1 13 3. .3 36 6
Indonesia 1.73  1.60  3,736 8.46 11.31 6 6. .2 22 2 5 5. .7 70 0 1 13 3, ,2 28 88 8  1 13 3. .6 65 5  1 15 5. .5 56 6
Japan 0.74  1.05  42,037 10.30 14.03 1 1. .7 78 8 1 1. .8 86 6 7 74 4, ,0 02 21 1  1 12 2. .9 98 8  1 15 5. .7 71 1
Korea 2.99  3.76  22,440 9.93 14.23 9 9. .4 47 7 8 8. .7 76 6 5 52 2, ,2 29 99 9  1 17 7. .0 07 7  2 20 0. .0 09 9
Malaysia 7.34  9.56  10,795 5.64 10.22 1 19 9. .9 97 7 1 17 7. .9 96 6 2 20 0, ,3 38 82 2  1 17 7. .0 04 4  1 18 8. .7 78 8
Mexico -0.06  -0.19  -1,132 -0.76 -2.77 6 6. .5 53 3 5 5. .9 94 4 3 35 5, ,9 95 59 9  1 10 0. .2 24 4  1 10 0. .5 51 1
New Zealand  1.77  3.49  3,017 8.54 12.00 7 7. .5 55 5 8 8. .4 42 2 7 7, ,2 28 84 4  1 15 5. .5 52 2  1 16 6. .3 30 0
Peru 0.92  0.79  482  8.04 10.96 1 1. .7 78 8 1 1. .4 48 8 9 90 03 3  9 9. .9 92 2  1 12 2. .1 11 1
Philippines 3.16  4.25  3,207 3.56 6.69 1 16 6. .8 80 0 1 15 5. .3 32 2 1 11 1, ,5 59 97 7  1 19 9. .4 41 1  1 19 9. .8 88 8
Russia 1.26  1.41  7,635 3.67 6.31 3 3. .8 87 7 3 3. .9 92 2 2 21 1, ,2 29 98 8  6 6. .0 00 0  9 9. .2 26 6
Singapore 7.20  10.56  9,963 3.97 4.82 2 20 0. .5 55 5 1 18 8. .8 82 2 1 17 7, ,7 76 65 5  1 16 6. .2 25 5  1 16 6. .5 59 9
Thailand 4.69  12.19  14,637 -4.28 30.64 3 34 4. .1 13 3 2 27 7. .7 74 4 3 33 3, ,4 40 09 9  4 47 7. .1 18 8  5 50 0. .4 47 7
Chinese Taipei  3.47  5.14  14,515 8.32 10.43 1 11 1. .5 54 4 1 11 1. .5 56 6 3 32 2, ,6 67 74 4  1 16 6. .3 32 2  1 17 7. .8 88 8
USA 0.70  0.69  73,020 9.12 6.15 1 1. .3 30 0 1 1. .1 19 9 1 12 26 6, ,3 35 55 5  1 10 0. .9 93 3  7 7. .4 40 0
Viet Nam  10.50  14.34  5,346 28.16 45.10 3 33 3. .5 52 2 2 26 6. .4 49 9 9 9, ,8 88 86 6  6 63 3. .8 84 4  6 66 6. .6 65 5
EU25  -0.09 -0.19 -22,142 -0.84 -2.37 - -0 0. .1 11 1 - -0 0. .0 09 9 - -1 10 0, ,2 29 97 7  - -1 1. .5 54 4  - -1 1. .5 56 6
ROW  -0.06 -0.43 -16,930 -1.67 -3.36 - -0 0. .3 38 8 - -0 0. .5 50 0 - -1 19 9, ,4 41 14 4  - -2 2. .3 36 6  - -2 2. .4 43 333 
 
Table 10. Effects of an FTAAP on APEC as a whole:   









Absolute Effects (% deviations from the Base) 
Static CGE Model  Scenario I  0.13  55,424    4.88    6.56 
Static CGE Model  Scenario II  0.20  75,621    5.12    6.88 
Static CGE Model  Scenario III 1.13  284,844    8.53    10.91 
Capital Accumulation CGE Model  Scenario III 3.31  636,009    14.73    15.89 
Relative Effects to Scenario III with Static CGE Model (Ratio) 
Static CGE Model  Scenario III 1.00  1.00    1.00    1.00 
Capital Accumulation CGE Model  Scenario III 2.93  2.23    1.73    1.46 
Relative Effects to Scenario I with Static CGE Model (Ratio) 
Static CGE Model  Scenario I  1.00  1.00    1.00    1.00 
Static CGE Model  Scenario II  1.54  1.36    1.05    1.05 
Static CGE Model  Scenario III 8.69  5.14    1.75    1.66 
Capital Accumulation CGE Model  Scenario III 25.46  11.48    3.02    2.42 
Notes: Scenario I-Tariff elimination 
Scenario II-Tariff elimination + Reduction in tariff equivalents of services by 10% 
Scenario III-Tariff elimination + Reduction in tariff equivalents of services by 10% + 
5% reduction in trade cost by trade facilitation34 
 
Table 11. Effects of TPP: Scenario III (% deviations from the Base) 
Tariff Elimination + Reduction in Tariff Equivalents of Services by 10% 
+ 5% Reduction in Trade Cost by Trade Facilitation 
 
 
 STATIC  MODEL  CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
MODEL 











Australia  0.92 1.15  6,553 2.33 4.19 2 2. .1 10 0    2 2. .0 05 5 1 11 1, ,6 69 97 7  4 4. .7 76 6  4 4. .6 69 9
Canada  0.02 0.39  3,403 1.15 1.33 0 0. .3 38 8 0 0. .6 69 9 6 6, ,0 07 78 8  1 1. .6 66 6  1 1. .7 72 2
Chile  1.47 1.77  1,484 0.93 1.10 3 3. .8 88 8 3 3. .8 83 3 3 3, ,2 21 18 8  3 3. .1 17 7  3 3. .1 11 1
China  0.01 0.13  2,016 0.44 0.21 0 0. .0 09 9 0 0. .2 24 4 3 3, ,7 70 08 8  0 0. .5 51 1  0 0. .5 52 2
Hong Kong  0.00 0.16 231  0.04 -0.09 0 0. .2 23 3 0 0. .4 44 4 6 63 34 4  0 0. .2 29 9  0 0. .2 27 7
Indonesia  0.00 0.07 170  0.31 0.10 0 0. .2 24 4 0 0. .3 39 9 9 91 10 0  0 0. .9 90 0  0 0. .9 94 4
Japan  0.00 0.02 731  0.88 -0.09 0 0. .0 01 1 0 0. .0 06 6 2 2, ,3 33 38 8  0 0. .4 40 0  0 0. .4 42 2
Korea  -0.01 0.08 495  0.27 0.06 0 0. .0 08 8 0 0. .2 21 1 1 1, ,2 22 22 2  0 0. .2 28 8  0 0. .2 28 8
Malaysia  0.00 0.54 607  0.26 0.00 0 0. .7 78 8 1 1. .3 38 8 1 1, ,5 55 50 0  1 1. .3 34 4  1 1. .3 35 5
Mexico  0.13 0.46  2,798 1.21 1.67 0 0. .7 78 8 1 1. .0 02 2 6 6, ,1 19 90 0  2 2. .2 21 1  2 2. .2 23 3
New Zealand  1.54 1.78  1,557 2.14 4.17 4 4. .4 47 7 4 4. .1 17 7 3 3, ,6 65 54 4  5 5. .5 55 5  5 5. .9 97 7
Peru  0.83 0.87 531  6.64 10.09 1 1. .5 57 7 1 1. .4 41 1 8 86 63 3  8 8. .5 54 4  1 10 0. .1 14 4
Philippines  -0.01 0.06 43  -0.03 -0.16 0 0. .3 32 2 0 0. .4 43 3 3 32 26 6  0 0. .4 40 0  0 0. .3 39 9
Russia  0.00 0.05 281  0.06 -0.10 - -0 0. .0 02 2 0 0. .0 05 5 2 26 69 9  0 0. .1 10 0  0 0. .0 09 9
Singapore  6.67 8.00  8,211 4.12 4.80 1 16 6. .1 10 0 1 12 2. .9 98 8 1 13 3, ,3 33 32 2  1 12 2. .7 74 4  1 13 3. .1 10 0
Thailand  -0.01 0.11 133  0.09 0.03 0 0. .4 41 1 0 0. .4 49 9 5 58 85 5  0 0. .7 73 3  0 0. .7 75 5
Chinese Taipei  0.00 0.15 425  0.14 0.05 0 0. .1 15 5 0 0. .3 33 3 9 93 31 1  0 0. .4 40 0  0 0. .3 39 9
USA  0.67 0.58  61,766 4.52 4.19 1 1. .0 04 4 0 0. .8 83 3 8 87 7, ,6 67 76 6  6 6. .0 07 7  4 4. .0 09 9
Viet Nam  6.08 9.05  3,373 6.64 14.92 1 13 3. .9 96 6 1 13 3. .0 05 5 4 4, ,8 86 61 1  1 18 8. .8 86 6  1 19 9. .6 61 1
EU25  -0.02 -0.01 -965  0.14 -0.21 0 0. .0 00 0 0 0. .0 04 4 4 4, ,8 89 90 0  0 0. .0 08 8  0 0. .0 07 7
ROW  0.00 0.05 1,974 0.19 -0.09 0 0. .0 05 5 0 0. .1 13 3 4 4, ,9 96 69 9  0 0. .2 23 3  0 0. .2 21 135 
 
Table 12. Effects of ASEAN+3: Scenario III (% deviations from the Base) 
Tariff Elimination + Reduction in Tariff Equivalents of Services by 10% 
+ 5% Reduction in Trade Cost by Trade Facilitation 
 











Australia -0.03 -0.21  -1,220  -0.66 -2.02 0 0. .0 09 9 0 0. .0 06 6 3 36 68 8  - -0 0. .9 93 3  - -0 0. .8 81 1
Canada -0.01 -0.02  -198  -0.30 -0.81 0 0. .1 1 0 0. .0 09 9 8 81 18 8  - -0 0. .6 63 3  - -0 0. .6 6
Chile -0.01 -0.12  -99  -0.60 -0.91 0 0. .1 17 7 0 0. .1 13 3 1 11 11 1  - -0 0. .4 45 5  - -0 0. .4 41 1
China 1.81 1.80  27,319 11.58 14.09 5 5. .7 72 2 5 5. .0 05 5 7 76 6, ,5 59 97 7  1 15 5. .0 08 8  1 18 8. .7 77 7
Hong Kong  0.00 0.07  101  -0.55 -0.84 1 1. .1 12 2 1 1. .4 44 4 2 2, ,0 09 91 1  0 0. .3 35 5  0 0. .2 29 9
Indonesia 1.59 1.62  3,787  6.97 9.69 5 5. .8 81 1 5 5. .4 46 6 1 12 2, ,7 74 44 4  1 12 2. .0 05 5  1 13 3. .5 57 7
Japan 0.59 0.86  34,165 7.11 11.44 1 1. .5 52 2 1 1. .5 53 3 6 60 0, ,9 93 39 9  1 10 0. .0 03 3  1 12 2. .1 18 8
Korea 2.70 3.35  19,989 8.45 12.42 8 8. .3 39 9 7 7. .6 67 7 4 45 5, ,7 78 88 8  1 14 4. .8 82 2  1 17 7. .3 34 4
Malaysia 5.10 7.22  8,150  4.49 9.08 1 16 6. .2 28 8 1 14 4. .6 66 6 1 16 6, ,6 60 03 3  1 14 4. .8 84 4  1 16 6. .7 74 4
Mexico 0.01 -0.03  -180  0.14 -0.71 - -0 0. .1 11 1 - -0 0. .1 1  - -6 62 21 1  - -0 0. .5 56 6  - -0 0. .6 68 8
New Zealand  -0.03 -0.16  -137  -0.49 -1.28 0 0. .2 2 0 0. .1 18 8 1 16 60 0  - -0 0. .4 45 5  - -0 0. .3 38 8
Peru 0.00 -0.04  -24  -0.25 -1.25 0 0. .0 04 4 0 0. .0 04 4 2 26 6  - -0 0. .5 5  - -0 0. .4 46 6
Philippines 3.08 3.87  2,925  2.50 5.47 1 15 5. .2 23 3 1 13 3. .6 69 9 1 10 0, ,3 36 60 0  1 16 6. .7 7  1 17 7. .0 06 6
Russia -0.02 -0.07  -382  -0.70 -1.03 0 0. .1 14 4 0 0. .1 14 4 7 74 44 4  - -0 0. .4 45 5  - -0 0. .4 43 3
Singapore 6.68 10.34  9,760  4.66 5.68 1 19 9. .6 65 5 1 18 8. .0 02 2 1 17 7, ,0 01 16 6  1 16 6. .6 67 7  1 17 7. .0 04 4
Thailand 4.18 11.24  13,496 -4.43 27.28 2 28 8. .9 91 1 2 24 4. .1 14 4 2 29 9, ,0 05 58 8  4 40 0. .1 11 1  4 42 2. .7 72 2
Chinese Taipei  -0.13 -0.65  -1,843  -1.33 -1.66 - -0 0. .5 53 3 - -0 0. .8 82 2 - -2 2, ,3 32 20 0  - -1 1. .9 92 2  - -1 1. .9 93 3
USA 0.00 -0.05  -5,392  0.23 -1.41 0 0. .0 05 5 0 0. .0 06 6 6 6, ,4 45 57 7  - -0 0. .4 49 9  - -0 0. .4 44 4
Viet Nam  7.09 10.20  3,801  17.68 31.30 2 22 2. .7 75 5 1 18 8. .5 52 2 6 6, ,9 90 04 4  4 42 2. .2 21 1  4 43 3. .8 89 9
EU25  -0.05 -0.09 -10,527 -0.37 -1.04 0 0. .1 11 1 0 0. .1 1  1 11 1, ,2 22 27 7  - -0 0. .5 59 9  - -0 0. .5 54 4




Table 13. Effects of ASEAN + 6: Scenario III (% deviations from the Base) 
Tariff Elimination + Reduction in Tariff Equivalents of Services by 10% 
+ 5% Reduction in Trade Cost by Trade Facilitation 
  











Australia 1.14 1.94  11,068 8.22 11.29 3 3. .4 47 7 3 3. .8 84 4 2 21 1, ,9 95 54 4  1 13 3. .0 02 2  1 12 2. .9 94 4
Canada -0.02 -0.04  -325  -0.43 -1.05 0 0. .0 02 2 0 0. .0 03 3 2 22 27 7  - -0 0. .8 86 6  - -0 0. .8 87 7
Chile -0.01 -0.18  -152  -0.91 -1.26 - -0 0. .0 03 3 - -0 0. .1 10 0 - -8 81 1  - -0 0. .9 94 4  - -0 0. .9 92 2
China 1.83 1.85  28,009 12.02 14.61 5 5. .8 80 0 5 5. .1 14 4 7 78 8, ,0 01 10 0  1 15 5. .6 60 0  1 19 9. .3 38 8
Hong Kong  0.00 -0.05  -68  -0.71 -1.09 0 0. .9 92 2 1 1. .2 23 3 1 1, ,7 78 80 0  0 0. .0 06 6  - -0 0. .0 04 4
Indonesia 1.61 2.48  2,144  5.42 8.53 6 6. .8 87 7 8 8. .6 61 1 2 20 0, ,0 09 97 7  1 19 9. .1 17 7  1 19 9. .7 76 6
Japan 0.60 0.86  34,103 7.81 12.11 1 1. .5 51 1 1 1. .5 51 1 6 60 0, ,2 26 68 8  1 10 0. .6 66 6  1 12 2. .9 91 1
Korea 2.76 3.42  20,397 8.77 12.84 8 8. .5 54 4 7 7. .8 81 1 4 46 6, ,6 61 16 6  1 15 5. .2 27 7  1 17 7. .8 87 7
Malaysia 5.16 7.79  8,790  4.81 9.38 1 16 6. .7 74 4 1 15 5. .5 54 4 1 17 7, ,6 61 15 5  1 15 5. .6 63 3  1 17 7. .3 36 6
Mexico -0.02 -0.06  -336  -0.08 -0.93 - -0 0. .1 17 7 - -0 0. .1 16 6 - -9 97 73 3  - -0 0. .8 81 1  - -0 0. .9 93 3
New Zealand  1.61 2.48  2,144  5.42 8.53 6 6. .2 24 4 6 6. .4 42 2 5 5, ,5 54 47 7  1 11 1. .0 07 7  1 11 1. .8 81 1
Peru -0.01 -0.05  -29  -0.42 -1.58 - -0 0. .0 02 2 - -0 0. .0 01 1 - -4 4  - -0 0. .8 81 1  - -0 0. .8 81 1
Philippines 3.10 3.80  2,873  2.60 5.56 1 15 5. .1 18 8 1 13 3. .5 57 7 1 10 0, ,2 26 68 8  1 16 6. .7 73 3  1 17 7. .1 10 0
Russia -0.01 -0.08  -408  -0.95 -1.33 0 0. .0 00 0 0 0. .0 00 0 - -2 24 4  - -0 0. .8 81 1  - -0 0. .8 85 5
Singapore 6.72 10.54  9,946  4.59 5.58 1 19 9. .7 79 9 1 18 8. .3 38 8 1 17 7, ,3 35 51 1  1 16 6. .7 75 5  1 17 7. .0 08 8
Thailand 4.27 11.31  13,576 -4.25 27.97 2 29 9. .6 60 0 2 24 4. .5 53 3 2 29 9, ,5 52 28 8  4 41 1. .2 27 7  4 44 4. .0 03 3
Chinese Taipei  -0.13 -0.72  -2,032  -1.46 -1.84 - -0 0. .6 67 7 - -1 1. .0 00 0 - -2 2, ,8 82 21 1  - -2 2. .1 19 9  - -2 2. .2 22 2
USA -0.01 -0.06  -6,906  0.18 -1.77 0 0. .0 01 1 0 0. .0 02 2 2 2, ,2 27 77 7  - -0 0. .7 70 0  - -0 0. .7 74 4
Viet Nam  7.15 10.29  3,834  17.95 31.61 2 22 2. .9 93 3 1 18 8. .6 69 9 6 6, ,9 96 69 9  4 42 2. .6 67 7  4 44 4. .3 34 4
EU25  -0.06 -0.11 -12,881 -0.56 -1.36 0 0. .0 01 1 0 0. .0 01 1 1 1, ,4 40 03 3  - -0 0. .9 90 0  - -0 0. .8 89 9
ROW  -0.04 -0.27 -10,494 -1.04 -1.96 - -0 0. .1 10 0 - -0 0. .1 17 7 - -6 6, ,6 61 13 3  - -1 1. .3 30 0  - -1 1. .3 32 2
 
 
 